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Resumen: La cuestión de la interpretación de Aristóteles por parte de la 
Academia alemana del siglo XIX es de interés tanto para filósofos como 
para economistas. Esto se debe a que el pensamiento clásico constituyó 
una cuestión de discusión e inspiración para el Idealismo, el Hegelianismo, 
el Historicismo y los economistas históricos alemanes (comenzando por 
Roscher) y su oponente austríaco, Carl Menger, fundador de la Escuela 
Austríaca de Economía. De este modo la filosofía antigua permaneció vi-
gente. Al evaluar esta recepción, en este trabajo se muestra que el debate 
sobre entidades colectivas versus individualidad encuentra allí una base, y 
el individualismo metodológico, una justificación. Esto resulta útil aún hoy en 
el siglo veintiuno, en que presenciamos una crisis de la corriente principal 
de la economía.
Palabras Clave: Aristóteles, Hegel (G. W. F.), Menger (Carl), Roscher 
(Wilhelm)
Abstract: It matters to philosophers and economists to display evidence 
how Aristotle was read in nineteenth century German-speaking Academia 
because the Ancient was a bone of contention and a source of inspiration 
for Idealism, Hegelianism, Historicism, the German Historical economists 
1)This article originates in a presentation I gave at Cuyo University, Mendoza, Argentina, on Novem-
ber 27th, 2012, at the workshop organized by Professor Ricardo F. CRESPO, to whom I express 
my deep thanks, as well as to participants who became discussants of good will. Any remaining 
error is naturally mine.
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(to begin with Roscher) and their Viennese contender, the founder of the 
Austrian School of Economics, Carl Menger. Ancient philosophy remained 
vivid then. In evaluating its reception, we show how the debate on collective 
entities versus individuality found therein a basis, and methodological indivi-
dualism a justification – something still useful in the twenty-first century in a 
crisis of the economic mainstream.
Keywords: Aristotle, Hegel (G. W. F.), Menger (Carl), Roscher 
(Wilhelm)
1. Introduction
It is quite known that the end of the nineteenth century was marked by a 
return to Aristotle in various academic disciplines of the German-speaking 
Academia in particular. Initiated by the progress of philological studies, the re-
discovery of Ancient thinkers, and Aristotle to begin with, played a major role 
in the reform of many disciplines, in the classical humanities and way beyond. 
That interest in retrospect competed with newer trends in philosophy: neo-
Kantianism, neo-Idealism, phenomenology, Lebensphilosophie. Whether one 
followed Aristotle or reacted against canonical views on the Stagirite’s ideas, 
influence was immense. And it bore heavily on many contemporary schol-
arly debates: for instance, in the field of logic in Austria in particular, Kantian 
views were challenged on a neo-Aristotelian basis by Brentano. Conversely, 
while Kant had stated (in his Critique of Pure Reason) that no further progress 
beyond logical rules of syllogism established by the Stagirite and refined by 
Medieval scholasts could happen, on the contrary, Frege, Hilbert and other 
German and Austrian logicians reshaped their field on a totally new basis. 
As far as economics (our main topic here) is concerned, the role played by 
Aristotelianism was at least as important2: on the one hand, Aristotle appeared 
as a standard, almost compulsory reference for any scholar educated in law 
schools (wherein the economic curriculum belonged); on the other hand, 
interpretations of his work diverged much according to the school to which 
his readers belonged. Whateever their interpretation, most economic scholars 
turned to the Stagirite at some point, be they conservative, reformist or even 
revolutionary: Karl Marx did so as well, mentioning Book V of the Nicomachean 
2)This is nothing to be surprised, as the link between Aristotelian philosophy and economics has 
been long recognized and explored further by erudite scholars. Let us quote in this journal the es-
say by CRESPO, Ricardo F., “Aristotle on the Economy” in Philosophia. Anuario de Filosofía, 2010, 
70, pp. 39-68.
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Ethics in his Capital. It is well-known that Aristotle’s was regarded as a supporter 
of “holism” or “collective concepts” (Kollektivbegriffe) by the members of the 
German Historical School, also known as Kathedersozialisten (Socialists of 
the Chair), who advocated a potent state (power-state or Machtstaat) focused 
on social and developmental policies. There was some kind of consensus to 
regard Aristotle as having left individuality aside and favored collective entities 
(to begin with the Greek city, or polis). Upheld essentially by Historicists, this 
interpretation was not without connection (despite these authors’ denial) 
with the image forged within German Idealism and Hegelian philosophy in 
particular, when Hegel described the “beautiful whole” (schöne Totalität) that 
the Greek polis had displayed in the Antiquity. 
To what extent, the vulgarized image of the Hegelian message 
corresponded to the reality of Hegel’s teaching is a story... which shall be dealt 
with in Part I in the following pages. The fact remained anyhow that Aristotle had 
been recruited for the authority attached to his name by German advocates of 
“collectivist” concepts in their fight against atomism, the view that characterized 
British Classical political economy and that prevailed in supporting the 
understanding of the role of the economic agent, or homo economicus. Now, 
this understanding of Aristotle would be challenged by the Viennese founder 
of the Austrian school of economics, Carl Menger (1840-1921) for whom the 
whole matter of Aristotelianism needed a re-examination based on the writings. 
Menger’s Aristotelianism has been much debated, including by myself and 
Professor Ricardo F. Crespo3. 
3)It is a very rich debate in which my host and I have engaged since we first met at HES annual 
meeting in Vancouver in 2000. We came after many other reknown scholars, but we brought, on my 
part, first-hand knowledge of Menger’s archives, and on the part of Ricardo Crespo his long-time 
discussion of Aristotle. Let me quote the following among our works:
CRESPO, Ricardo F., ‘Three Arguments Against Menger’s suggested Aristotelianism’, Journal des 
économistes et des études humaines, 13, 2003, pp. 63-84; “The Ontology of the ‘Economic’: an 
Aristotelian Analysis”, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 30/5, 2006, pp. 767-781;  «Aristotle’s 
Science of Economics» in S. Gregg and I. Harper (eds), Christian Morality and Market Economies, 
Edward Elgar Pub. Ltd, 2008, pp. 13-24; “The Economics According to Aristotle: Ethical, Political 
and Epistemological Implications”, Foundations of Science, 13/3-4, 2008, pp. 281-294; “Aristotle”, 
in I. van Staveren and J. Peil (eds), Elgar Handbook of Economics and Ethics: Cheltenham, 2009, 
pp. 14-20.
CAMPAGNOLO, Gilles, “Une source philosophique de la pensée économique de Carl Menger: 
l’Éthique à Nicomaque d’Aristote”, Revue de philosophie économique, 6, 2002, pp. 5-35; Carl Men-
ger, Entre Aristote et Hayek: aux sources de l’économie moderne, Paris, CNRS Éditions, 2008, 241 
p.; «Origins of Menger’s Thought in French Liberal Economists», Review of Austrian Economics, 
22/1, 2009, pp. 53-79; «Deutsche Archive in Japan und das Beispiel: Carl Menger und sein Vers-
tändnis der Nikomachischen Ethik des Aristoteles“ in H. Kurz (ed.), Schriften des Vereins für Sozial-
politik (Neue Folge), 115/XXVII, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 2012, pp. 131-177; with M. LAGUEUX, 
Les rapports d’échange selon Aristote. Éthique à Nicomaque V et VIII-IX”, Dialogue, XLIII/3, 2004, 
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The main issue in nineteenth century debate is whether it was possible 
to combine Aristotelianism and a methodology based upon the individual. 
Menger demonstrated it was possible. Crespo and I agree, but some careful 
explanation on how and why this is so is in order, and that will be Part II of the 
present article: the reading of the Ancient by Menger, the modern founder of 
the Austrian school of economics.
2. On Aristotle in 19th century German Academia: how to 
avoid some mistakes
Among 19th century German commentators on Aristotelian thought, and to 
this day, two major misunderstandings are displayed, that one must pay atten-
tion not to frivolously uphold: 
•	 the first one touches upon the nature assigned of economics, 
per se, according to different schools, related to the nature of 
the individual in Ancient and Modern philosophers. 
•	 the second one is related to much needed clarification 
concerning second-hand literature when appreciating how the 
discrepancies from point I are reflected in their writings.
2.1. The nature of economics and of the individual in Ancient 
and Modern philosophers
Quite clearly enough – and it may be one of the main reasons for the vul-
gar understanding of Aristotelianism by German economists in the nineteenth 
century – that the role of the individual in the context and the conceptual frame 
of Modern times could be neither identical nor applied merely as such to the 
socio-political and intellectual environment of Antiquity. 
The notions of “private vs. public” and of “individual consciousness” 
were, to say the least, completely different. Or, to say it better, such couple 
of notions did not exist as such in Antiquity, a fact that was stressed by Hegel 
pp. 443-469; with A. LORDON, ‘Menger était-il aristotélicien? Nouvelles réflexions sur un débat 
déjà ancien à l’occasion d’une réponse à Ricardo F. Crespo’, in Campagnolo, G. (ed.) 2011: Existe-
t-il une doctrine Menger? Aux origines de la pensée économique autrichienne, Aix-en-Provence, 
PUP, 2011, pp. 45-74. 
The last item was a reply from me and a French colleague who has now left the academic world, 
to Ricardo Crespo, and it brought Ricardo and I to co-author a paper presented at ESHET Con-
ference, Buenos-Aires, 2012: “A Franco-Argentinian Debate: Was Carl Menger Aristotelian?”, for-
thcoming publication.
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in his system, when comparing Ancient philosophy, to extoll its ‘Schönheit’, 
with Modern times. To understand progress in History – the revelation of the 
Concept through the development of Time, one must clearly see when notions 
themselves are born – for they indeed were born, whether from the human 
mind or the ‘Zeitgeist’. Therefore, even when German Historicists pretended 
not to follow the Hegelian philosophy of history (Geschichtsphilosophie), they 
could but in fact rely on it implicitly, despite their denial (or their neglect). As 
Heidegger would later say: most often commentators wore glasses cut by the 
Berlin ‘professor of professors’. As a consequence, the image of an Ancient 
world essentially devoid of individual consciousness and as well as of a stage 
representing civil society was commonplace. And it was not erroneous as such 
– that is, if one pays attention to give these notions their Hegelian definitions. 
Proof of the role played by that conception of Antiquity is the dispute that 
rose whether categories forged for the analysis of modern capitalism were ap-
propriate (or not) in order to discuss the realities of Antiquity. In the German 
historicist academia that debate was started by Karl Bücher, once a student in 
classical philology, then a professor of political economy (in Basel, Karlsruhe 
and Leipzig), against authors who, like Hans Mayer, described on a much too 
simplistic basis Ancient economies as basically some sort of early capitalism 
(this simplified outline is for the sake of the present essay). Max Weber was to 
later position himself midway on this topic, clarifying in the process both some 
factual aspects of Ancient Greek and Roman history, and the limits of the ade-
quate use of modern economic categories. 
What was the nature of Ancient economies? That topic became a major 
issue between historicists, as if history meant development of earlier non-
existing categories, how could one apply these to earlier times and forms of 
life? It is not only in order to test contemporary categories of modern science, 
but also because resorting to ideas of the Ancients was still common in the 
Academia of Mitteleuropa in the nineteenth century, that the issue mattered so 
much.4 Obviously, the word “economics” is traced back to the Greek language: 
“Economics”, “Ökonomie” is formed on o„konom…a, the combination of oikos (o‡koj) 
and nomos (nÒmoj), indicating the “family” or “household” management laws. 
Now, do not these laws evolve according to the emergence of newer spheres, 
like the market place and, later on, civil society, or ‘Bourgeois’ (‘bürgerliche 
4)One may point out how Bücher ended on siding with Menger in the dispute over the methods 
(the famous “Methodenstreit”) against Schmoller and historical inductive methods. Therefore the 
understanding of Ancient philosophy gave all at the time some common, however disputed it was, 
ground to present their views.
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Gesellschaft’)? Xenophon, for instance, in his Economics, presented Socrates 
debating with Kritobulos, discussing how “it belongs to the fine ‘economist’ 
[o„konÒmou] to administer his home in the right way” and then paralleling the art of 
the “economist” to that of the “competent builder (™pistamšnwj o„kodÒmoj)” in that 
both receive wages to respectively govern (o„konomoànta) and build (o„kodomoànta) 
a house, even if it were not their own.5 
The consequence of accounting for the Ancient meaning of economics, 
through restating Xenophon’s and Aristotle’s views in the nineteenth century 
was to restate the position of the “economist” in the sense of the observer but 
also, of what we now call a “manager”. “Economic activity” characterized a kind 
of “management”, and the manager may act for his/her own family’s sake, or 
as a founder, a leader or even a salaried employee in modern firms. The socio-
economic meaning of the entrepreneur was reshaped at a par with that of the 
notion of ‘capitalism’6. Now, for Aristotle, the tasks of procuring and of using 
were distinguished: chrematistics or “wealth-getting” (crematistik») is the art of 
making money with money – call it “speculation” – in contrast with economics 
(o„konomik»), the art of using goods intended for the household. Procuring 
(por…sasqai) is not adequate in using household goods. In Greek thought, as 
represented by Aristotle, there is obviously no other meaning of “economics” 
than that of what we would call “household management”:
Now it is clear that wealth-getting is not the same art as household management, 
for the function of the former is to provide and that of the latter to use – for what 
will be the art that will use the contents of the house if not the art of household 
management?7 
Modernity of course changes that: a direct consequence of the Aristotelian 
definition is that ‘correct’ management is fit to the purpose of obtaining goods 
for the necessities of life and concerns more directly the purpose of survival 
and life in the family circle than any other goal. This is also written in the ope-
ning lines of the first of the three apocryphal texts that are entitled Economics 
and that were still in the period I consider (and until the twentieth century) re-
garded as authored by Aristotle. The quote from Works and Days by Hesiod 
says a man should first acquire a wife, have children, and provide himself with 
5)XENOPHON, Economics, I, 1-4. That comparison starts the whole dialogue imagined by Xeno-
phon.
6)See CAMPAGNOLO, G. and VIVEL, C., «Before Schumpeter: forerunners of the theory of the 
entrepreneur in 1900’s German political economy - Werner Sombart, Friedrich von Wieser», The 
European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 19 (2012), 6, pp. 909-944.
7)ARISTOTLE, Politics, I, 1256a13, tr. H. Rackham, Loeb Classical Library, 1977, p. 33.
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slaves and a plow ox.8 
The ancient art of economics is an art limited to the domain where the 
owner possesses slaves as well as cattle and governs for the good of his 
family circle, obedient wife and children. All in contrast both with both the art 
of acquiring (e„doj ktetikšj) by means of plunder in war and through hunting 
in peacetime, and the art of governing the city (its administrators are called 
‘politiko‹j’, whereas family governance belongs to the ‘o„konÒmoij’.9 The 
management is different in kind in both cases and no confusion could even be 
imagined in a Greek context. 
Now the context had changed with Modern times. And what Hegel restated 
properly was the due characterization of precisely the mix that “political 
economy” had brought. Where does the difference lie? One main divergence is 
that individuality as such had finally blossomed (through a long course induced 
by Christianity). The discovery of the self as bearer of “consciousness” opens 
up one subjective world: one of the most important particularity of subjectivity 
is that it cannot be reduced to the ability to make choices. For instance, in 
Xenophon, Heracles is shown ready to make choices, standing at crossroads: 
the half-god is a parangon of such human “choice” in this eponymous apologue, 
but even there, the hero is not defined by consciousness of his own self (no 
consequence surch as ergo sum is derived) but merely by the embarrassment 
to weigh pros and cons of each possible path he may take. 
Subjectivity is definitely more than that what appears in Xenophon: 
subjectivity is consciousness of one’s own self, beginning by the representation 
that the Christian God (who has created one to his own image) provides for it. 
Hence Feuerbach after Hegel. But already Hegel’s conception of Christianism, 
hence also his description of modern civil (or bourgeois) society as but the 
assessment of modern condition of mankind within the realm of ‘objective spirit’ 
(Objektiver Geist), or in other words the socio-economic world of customary life 
8)ARISTOTLE, Economics (apocryphal) or Oeconomica, the quote from Hesiod by Aristotle is 
(1343a22): “Homestead first, and a woman; a plough-ox hardy to furrow”, Aristotle’s own list is 
(1343a18): “The component parts of a household are (1) human beings, and (2) goods and chat-
tels” ; among humans, and close to plough-oxes, slaves attending various occupations are not to 
be forgotten (tr. C. Armstrong, Loeb Classical Library, 1977, p. 329). The same quote from Hesiod 
appears in Politics, I, 1252b 12 (quoted by Aristotle from Hesiod, translated slightly differently by H. 
Rackham): “First and foremost, a house and a wife, and an ox for the ploughing”, Politics, op. cit., 
p. 7. The point is clear anyhow. And the unknown author of the Oeconomica may well have directly 
taken his model from the Politics. 
9)ARISTOTLE, Politics, I, 1256b 27-38: “One kind of acquisition therefore in the order of nature is a 
part of the household art, in accordance with which either there must be forthcoming or else that art 
must procure to be forthcoming a supply of those goods, capable of accumulation, which are nec-
essary for life and useful for the community of city or household”, tr. H. Rackham, op. cit., p. 37-39.
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(Sittlichkeit: “ethical life”), meaning precisely everyday life filled with customs 
and material concerns of acquiring goods and satisfying needs. In Modernity, 
each and everyone is first and foremost seen by all as being alone within 
society. As Smith put it, in his famous line: “we do not expect the goods we 
need from the benevolence of the butcher or the baker”. In that sense, “political 
economy” can start only when o„konomik» has come to an end. 
2.2. A few aspects on the reading of Aristotle in nineteenth 
century German Academia
The second point we heralded (how German-speaking scholars 
appreciated the discrepancies between Ancient and Modern times in their 
writings on economics and the individual) touches upon second-hand literature 
that reflected Aristotle’s works, first with respect to the philological tradition, 
and beyond. I will not even begin a detailed description here: German philology 
deserves volumes to deal with it. What is of interest to us here is the influence 
Aristotle thus brought to German academia at large, besides philological 
circles, yet often stemming from them.
Let me point only to one example, that of Friedrich Nietzsche’s Introduction 
to the Study of Plato’s Dialogues where Aristotle is referred half a dozen times 
always as a reference to philological studies of the times10 and always as a 
source of interest as to indicate Plato’s views (and from Plato, Socrates’): 
philological studies come first. German philologists also cleared doubts about 
the three apocryphal Economics (Oikonomikoi) that had been until then thought 
by Aristotle, which was not obvious: for instance, when Carl Menger read these 
(the first two being attached as an appendix to his German translation of the 
Nicomachean Ethics, by Dr. Riedler), he still regarded them as by Aristotle’s 
hand. 
I just mentioned Nietzsche, this is no coincidence: the understanding of 
Ancient Greece had been initiated by Lessing and dominant with Winckelmann, 
the archeologist and historian of art. The general view was of serene and 
harmonious unity, espoused and magnified by Herder, Goethe, Schiller 
as well as the young Hölderlin. Hegel was no different, as hinted above, in 
seeing Greece as a “schöne Totalität” of citizenship and statehood originally 
united – not ever to be reconciled, though. Conciliation would imply an earlier 
10)NIETZSCHE, Friedrich, Einleitung in das Studium der platonischen Dialoge: Nietzsche quotes 
mainly from Metaphysics (A6, G5, M4, N4) with one reference to the De Anima and one to the 
Politics.
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separation: Greece came before that separation (the Christian momentum). 
Nietzsche rejected Christianity and that view on Greece, famously with his 
texts on tragedy in Ancient Greece and the inner conflict between Dyonisian 
vs. Apollinian contents of Ancient Greece. The point is that not only Modernity 
brings conflict, but it already prevailed, albeit in a different manner. Conversely 
to Romanticist hopes of reconciliation, Hegel was a realist: no harmonious 
“Golden Age”, if it had ever existed, could be retrieved in Modern times. 
Nietzsche was even clearer: no harmony had been lost forever, for it had 
nevere existed. But the conflict was of a different – and according to him, more 
sane nature, than the one now lived by the Moderns.
 Hegelian rationalism showed that Greek harmony meant that contradictions 
had not yet been unfolded, but would necessarily unfold. Dialectics prevented 
Hegel from nostalgia and from naive views of the Sturm und Drang Romantics, 
albeit sharing the same soil. Hegel had prepared for a better understanding of 
Ancient Greece, Aristotle its main representative. But Hegel’s disciples (and 
German intellectuals at large) would rather oppose that development, either in 
nostalgia for the past (against the industrial modern world, like in Romanticism) 
or in the hope for a revolution (Marxism being only one such case): both shared 
in a view of Ancient Greece supported by Aristotelian scholarship, and wished 
“totality” had remained, whatever that could mean. Actually, it came to signify, 
and found a new use as a building block of a half-enchanted German stat-
ist and racial national collective (das deutsche Volk) that would substitute for 
Greece in many minds, fanciful in their representations and at times dangerous 
in their implications (starting from Fichte’s early nineteenth century Reden an 
die deutsche Nation). One needed some imagination to apply a forged Greek 
revitalized ideal to the German path to Modernity, but the German so-called 
‘special path’ (‘Sonderweg’) was indeed the name for it. Altogether, the image 
of Aristotle was part of it, and the Stagirite was regarded as the father to holistic 
theories (the people, the state: das Volk, der Staat etc.) over the individual, 
deemed but part of such wholes that preceded him/her at all levels: chronologi-
cally, logically, methodologically and ontologically.
Part of the building of German Historical Economics finds here its origin. 
One can trace these in the writings of the founder of the school, Wilhelm 
Roscher, and in some later representative characters like already mentioned 
Karl Bücher. Floundering about original principles of historical holism, yet 
within the confines of the tradition recalled here, brought these authors close 
to blindness with regard to necessarily changing times and the progress of 
science. A second aspect is the judgment one may take on the whole attitude 
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of historicism, a critical one like Menger’s. 
For now, let us recall that Roscher’s methodology derived from his 
inaugural outline of 1842, his dissertation Life, Works and Times of Thucydides 
from Göttingen historian Ranke’s “workshop”, so to speak. Roscher would not 
deviate from his adopted views on how to deal with history. He evolved (as 
is quite natural) in the detail of the very stages of political development he 
identified: in 1892 (that is, almost at the end of his career and in the last volume 
of his System) he published Politics: A Historical Natural Doctrine of Monarchy, 
Aristocracy and Democracy11. 
Almost half a century earlier, Roscher had lived through the 1848 failed 
attempt at a democratic revolution and constitutional Germany united under 
the Prussian monarchy, the seize of power by Bismarck later on with the same 
goal (minus democracy, of course) and the brith of the Second Reich in 1871 in 
the Galerie des Glaces of Versailles Palace after the French had been routed. 
It was quite natural that Caesarism (Kaiserismus) emerged from the process to 
German minds. One may wonder what that had to do with Aristotelian views? 
Indeed when it came to politics, the discourse on how political stages develop 
was always in the background. Yet, it counted less than the realization of 
German dreams of national unity. 
Roscher was also less inclined to draw a strict correspondence between 
economics and politics, than to celebrate German new power: as many 
German scholars, he pointed to the role of Germans in events that shaped 
universal history – in his case, through the economy. How economic events 
took place was decisive in how deep historical trends happened: the role of 
the economist appeared to discover this, through examining historical parallels 
and political events. To repeat the course of history was foremost: how large 
towns developped, and in which location preferrably, at which epoch, and so 
on. Roscher’s 1871 Observations on that topic were undoubtedly foundational 
for regional economics as well12. Hints at the special role played by some 
‘charismatic’ leader were also disseminated, paving the way to Max Weber’s 
approach (and to further more regrettable realities). Monographs written at the 
time were intended to bring available factual knowledge to projects of progress 
for German powerhouse. And economics was regarded as the scientific 
11)Wilhelm ROSCHER’s respectively first and last work: Leben, Werk und Zeitalter des Thukydides, 
Göttingen, 1842  and Politik: Geschichtliche Naturlehre der Monarchie, Aristokratie und Demokra-
tie, Berlin, 1892.
12)ROSCHER, Wilhelm, Betrachtungen über die geographische Lage der großen Städte, Duncker 
& Humblot, Leipzig.
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direction to that effect.
Nevertheless, was all that to be traced to the reading of Aristotle? Evidently, 
not directly. Yet, the issue remains, embedded in the historical views on 
methodology that Aristotle was made the father of the dominant perspective 
favoring collective entities, from which derived most studies and distinctions 
between various periods, places and peoples (including races). Some criterion 
was needed for distinguishing: to the historian, whose art was then considered 
mostly narrative, it suffices to look at the Göttingen School, where Roscher 
came from, and at its major name, Leopold von Ranke to see the largest extent 
given to a German “civilizational history”. Ranke and his disciples did not deal 
directly with political economy. It was Roscher who transferred their methodo-
logy to this subject, judging that human material life, seen as the daily process 
of work, exchange etc., deserved as much attention as other events. Empirical 
life was examined to achieve an accurate description of historical development. 
I regarded politics as the doctrine of the laws of development of the state, and poli-
tical economy and statistics as facets of politics, being particularly significant bran-
ches that should thus be elaborated meticulously and in great detail. I have reflec-
ted upon each and every law of development through comparing the epochs of the 
life of the various peoples that I know of […] My doctrine of the state [Staatslehre] 
is preliminary based upon those studies of universal history.13
Regarding “universal history”, Roscher’s contemporaries referred alterna-
tely to Christian theology proper or the doctrines of Hegel, who had brought 
philosophy to it, through his ‘philosophical history of philosophy’, so to speak14. 
Besides, Aristotle served as the usual reference to all those who wished/nee-
ded a refuge under his respectable umbrella to put forth some of their histori-
cal tales enacting collective entities/concepts, or Kollektivbegriffe. That lasting 
temptation was to be cut short by Menger, on whom the next section will focus, 
showing how the consensus was broken in the field of economics as it had 
been in philosophy by Nietzsche. This, I was lucky enough to read in Menger’s 
own archives, his personal papers on Aristotle and with regard to his rejection 
of the primacy of collective entities. I will now deal with that content.
13)ROSCHER, Wilhelm, Leben, Werk und Zeitalter des Thukydides, op. cit., p. vii. Our translation.
14)That attempt partly originated in Jakob Brucker Historia critica philosophiae (1744) the “most 
erudite man in Germany” according to Kant who used his works to prepare his own lectures on 
Plato – and Aristotle as well
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3. Menger as a Reader of Aristotle: how “Methodological 
Individualism” can be rooted in the Nicomachean Ethics and 
in the Politics
3.1. General considerations
Indeed, it is a general truth (and always a major issue) in the history 
(and philosophy) of economic thought to establish evidence for transmission 
of ideas. The milieu is essential, and that was precisely the case in German-
speaking universities, in the Austro-Hungarian empire and in Germany. The 
influence of Kant was pervasive. Yet, it had encountered difficulties entering 
the Catholic and ‘conservative’ milieu of the Austro-Hungarian empire from 
the start. Berlin and Vienna competed. But since Fichte, Hegel, Savigny and 
other professors in Berlin was regarded as a threat. And only aggravated after 
the defeat of Austria at the battle of Königgrätz. Further south, though, until 
the limits of the German-speaking realm with Slavic and Latin peoples, the 
influence of Aristotle remained strong.
However, to make the case that influence exist between two authors is 
always a touchy issue. When those lived at different periods (say, Antiquity 
and the nineteenth century, Aristotle and Menger), naturally it goes through 
the reading of one by the other. But is there enough to point out that there was 
influence? Even the fact that the latecomer read the works of the precursor, 
even that he read those before writing his own books, might well be insufficient. 
The later author may developed his own views quite independently and only 
thereafter found comfort and a confirmation of his views in the works of the 
earlier thinker. It follows that, short of an explicit acknowledgement, it is almost 
impossible to make a hard case for the transmission of any particular ideas. 
Without evidence, speculation is left wide open. And even though speculation 
may help clarify views of authors at stake, well-inspired commentators may 
put face to face interesting pieces of economic writings without making a 
convincing case. One must call on for more caution. Evidence remains needed. 
Now, in some cases, like that of Menger and Aristotle, evidence is 
there, drawn from genuine material in abundance. Menger’s annotations 
on his own volume of the Nicomachean Ethics is such a most illustrative 
example. The volume in possession of Menger was the translation by Dr. J. 
Riedler, Nikomachische Ethik, in the series of Aristoteles Werke, Schriften 
zur praktischen Philosophie, within the Griechische Prosaiker in neuen 
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Übersetzungen published by Offander in Stuttgart in 1856, still available in 
Mengers library located in Japan under call number “Philos. 1”, there is that 
volume of Nikomachische Ethik, a small book, similar to a paperback, quite 
obviously much utilized by his owner, many places in the margins filled with 
manuscript annotations15. 
Now, Menger’s handnotes indeed permit a quite remarkable double 
correspondence: on the one hand, with the development of his own comments 
on the German edition volume of the text by Aristotle;  on the other hand, 
with the notes that Menger left in his own copy of his 1871 masterwork, the 
Principles of Political Economy (Grundsätze der Volkswirtschaftslehre) and it 
is  so much so that the contents is the more instructive through systematic 
comparison. Previous work on Menger’s archives brought me results with 
proof of what commentators had previously only as intuitions on Menger’s 
Aristotelianism. Conversely, all I put forth is documented16. In order to get 
well-grounded “influence”, which is quite slippery as said above, requires to 
interweave many kinds of evidence, from claims set by authors acknowledging 
ideas they received from early on, in public declarations, in published material 
or in unpublished notes written only for his/her own sake. These are later 
retrieved by researchers and manuscript annotations indeed make clear 
in Menger’s case where inspiration and influence melted. In unpublished 
material (much of Menger’s notes), the historian displays that new material still 
unknown to reassess earlier “intuitions”: for instance, a debate that has long 
exercised commentators’ astuteness, on the nature of Aristotelian value theory 
for Menger (from article by Oscar Kraus, 1905 to Barry Smith, 1990, among 
others) can thus be definitively solved through textual evidence gathered at the 
source, as hinted by Emil Kauder and achieved by myself.17 
15)As for almost all Aristotelian texts, the “books” into which the Nicomachean Ethics were divided 
had been decided by Aristotle’s early publishers. In the Nicomachean Ethics, this is complicated by 
traditions different in English and German editions: the first based on the work by Zell and Didot, 
from France (it has its source back to Argyropoulos and Lefevre d’Etaples), the second from Bekker 
(and earlier on from Th. Zwingger and Duval). Naturally, in the German version, Menger owned a 
copy based on that latter system. The reader will find a fine explanation of both reference systems 
in the editing work achieved in 1959 for the French edition (Louvain / Paris) by Gauthier and Jolif. In 
English, refer to the translation by H. Rackham, Heinemann & Harvard UP, London & Harvard, 1926, 
reed. 1962 – we follow this well-known call system (four-digit number followed first by letters “a” or 
“b” – due to formerly odd and even pages – and finally by the line number). 
16)See CAMPAGNOLO, G., “Une source philosophique de la pensée économique de Carl Menger: 
l’Éthique à Nicomaque d’Aristote”; op. cit. (2008), Carl Menger, Entre Aristote et Hayek, op. cit.; 
(2010), Criticisms of Classical political economy. Menger, Austrian Economics and the German Hi-
storical School, London-New York, Routledge, xxiv + 416 p.; (2012), « Deutsche Archive in Japan 
und das Beispiel: Carl Menger und sein Verständnis der Nikomachischen Ethik des Aristoteles“ 
op. cit.
17)References: KRAUS, O. (1905) “Die aristotelische Werttheorie in ihren Beziehungen zu den Leh-
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Even after exploring archives, one may admittedly still doubt whether a 
discovery was genuine or had merely found confirmation in earlier thinking, 
or was directly borrowed. On the influence of Aristotle’s ideas upon Menger, 
much confusion can be swept away using strong facts uncovered when using 
archives. This allows to avoid the second mistake mentioned above when it 
is manageable (not always) 18. When possible to work on texts, then a highly 
probability appears that connections be made for good and their nature can 
indeed be determined with minimal doubt. Regarding Menger, the contents 
of his own private collection, especially his library now located at Hitotsubashi 
University Center for Social Sciences (Japan) helps us. I here discuss mostly 
the copy owned by Menger of the Nicomachean Ethics and I make use of 
notes in the translation of Aristotle dated 1856 owned by Menger to show how 
Menger did not only frame his thoughts, but went through inspiration that helps 
understand the challenge he posed both to German Historicists and British 
Classics. Menger built a new economics as a science on his use of Aristotle’s 
ideas, not surprising a fact after all among Austrian and German-speaking 
scholars, but this time that is proven by archives: here are some elements, on 
the theory of value, the issue of methodological individualism and other topics 
related. 
Wherein can Aristotle be said the major philosophical source of Menger (at 
least concerning Ancient thought)? For the whole matter of Aristotelianism in 
Menger, see the erudite controversy between myself and Professor Crespo19. 
As a reader of Aristotle, Menger left hints in the archives from which I work 
first on value, then on issue about the nature of Aristotelian inspiration on the 
topic of individualism, the City and Kollektivbegriffe? Was Menger paradoxical 
in taking there his inspiration and what was his interpretation?
ren der moderner Psychologenschule.” Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, offprint sent 
by the author to C. Menger. Tübingen: Laup Buchhandlung (no English translation); SMITH, B. 
(1990) “Aristotle, Menger and Mises: an Essay in the Metaphysics of Economics.” In: Caldwell, 
B. (Ed.) Carl Menger and His Legacy in Economics. Annual Supp. to vol. 22, History of Political 
Economy, pp. 263-288. Durham: Duke UP; KAUDER, E. (1957) “Intellectual and Political Roots of 
the Older Austrian School.” Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie, 17: 411-425. Also to quote: ALTER M., 
Carl Menger and the Origins of Austrian Economics, Boulder, Oxford, Colorado UP, 1990; BLAUG 
M. dir., Carl Menger, Cambridge UP, 1992.
18)Antoher example: Erich Streissler insisted that one remains doubtful on some aspects of 
Menger’s realism regarding borrowed Aristotelian “essentialism” (with the recurring us of the Ger-
man ‘Wesen’). The only answer is to look into archives: unfortunately, the volume of Aristotle’s logi-
cal works, his Canon in particular, owned by Menger have disappeared from the library. But many 
notes still exist. Due to the volumes missing, a correspondence between Menger’s manuscript 
annotations on copies of his own works and notes on Arsitotle’s texts cannot be found. That is an 
unfortunate fact, which keeps doubts alive: in such case, commentators are left with their intuitions 
to convince each other in favor of some solution that depends on astuteness and knowledge.
19)See note 3 above.
Elements of the reception of Aristotelian thought 
Philosophia 2013/2 I 27
3.2. From the archives of Menger
In reading Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Menger questioned Aristotle 
on the origin of value20. Menger read both Book V (on Justice) and Books VIII 
and IX (on friendship, or partnership). That issue was not directly elaborated by 
Aristotle as to what we call “economic value”21. Aristotle ranked different kinds of 
‘friendship’ or philia, and formulated its lowest form as a “conscientiously useful 
partnership”, providing Menger with enough hints to uncover the mechanism 
ruling the exchange process. 
How subjective valuation of goods meet and eventually match each 
other, how some price range is set within that process, how partners “form” 
a price (instead of being “price-takers” in what would become the generally 
accepted view in modern economics under standard assumptions of market 
competition), all influenced Menger’s representation of the exchange. He 
describes that process from a dual partnership first, towards a whole market 
system in a second stage, the order in which he copes with this issue in his 
1871 Grundsätze. Manuscript annotations were added after publication and 
confirm that way of thinking significantly: Menger did not read Aristotle before 
or after he wrote his masterwork, but all along. That reading accompanied the 
whole process of his reflections.22 From Menger’s reading of Aristotle’s works, 
the idea that individuals are “price-makers” rather than “price-takers” may also 
be drawn. It would become the focus of the school Menger was later reckoned 
to ground, the so-called “Austrian school”. Rather than some unique “principle” 
of marginal substitution that would authorize to fix equilibrium prices, potentially 
leading to a mathematically exact determined partial market equilibrium 
(Jevons, reworked by Marshall), or even to a general equilibrium (as in Walras), 
Menger insists on a dynamic process and does not reach a unique price, but 
a price range between partners who seek to satisfy needs in trading goods.23 
To satisfy some felt need (which is what ‘Bedürfnisbefriedigung’ means) 
one first feels the urge and then identifies alternative possible satisfactions: 
a purely subjective process that rules out that need might be objectively 
20)CAMPAGNOLO, G., op. cit. from 2002 and 2010 (Chapter 7, section 2, pp. 227-239.
21)CAMPAGNOLO and LAGUEUX, 2004, op. cit.
22)In the Austro-Hungarian Empire, students had to see the Aristotelian corpus in the original Greek 
as well as in German translation. Menger’s latest notebooks (at Duke University) show he was still 
reading it in his old age.
23)The interested reader will refer to the example of trading cows for horses in the example de-
veloped in MENGER, Carl, Grundsätze der Volkswirtschaftslehre, pp. 63-69 of the original edition, 
reprinted by J. C. B. Mohr, Tübingen in 1970, pp. 183-186 of the English tr. by Dingwall J. & Hoselitz 
B., 1976.
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determined. Its valuation (upon which starting exchange depends) is 
subjective, provided conditions in the individual’s environment offer solutions: 
then the individual is convinced that he/she would benefit from engaging in 
trade. Friends/partners who are “useful to each other” are individuals engaged 
in economic actions (wirtschaftenden Menschen) as the basis of a mechanism 
found both in Menger and Aristotle. Menger was glad – annotations leave no 
doubt – to see his insights conform with the Ancient, a rchival material shows 
that in that sense Menger can be surely said to be “Aristotelian”. 
This qualification goes further than the issue of value, though: in particular 
the importance of the individual in Menger must be stressed as identified in the 
Ancient as a source (among others). That stand may indeed seem paradoxical 
given the way we explained that Aristotelian creed was accepted in Menger’s 
times: ‘Aristotelianism’ (whatever was meant through the use of that word) was 
indeed regarded as supporting authority for holism as the belief in collective 
entities in political economy was usual in the German Historical School defining 
a modern national National-ökonomie on the basis of the German community. 
Being a Viennese and from a city rival to Berlin may have influenced Menger 
when he assessed how Aristotle was wrongly taken to present evidence from 
the Greek polis to a German ‘Stadtgeist’. 
What did Aristotle say in the Nicomachean Ethics that calls for Menger’s 
adoption? He indeed stressed that his analysis of justice, fairness in trade in 
general maintained order and adherence to the community (koinwn…a), essential 
to the fact that individuals, here regarded as citizens, live in common (koin»), 
combining both kinds of justice, commutative and distributive together only 
may obtain its perpetuation:
In the interchange of services Justice in the form of Reciprocity is the bond that 
maintains the association: reciprocity, that is, on the basis of proportion, not on the 
basis of equality. The very existence of the state depends on proportionate recipro-
city […] and it is the exchange that binds them [men] together.24
Indeed, such continuity of the community was Aristotle’s aim. Thus, the 
reason why Historicists insisted was Aristotle’s definition of the utmost good 
as the good of the whole City in its entirety. And what they disregarded was 
the fact that Aristotle based it upon the preliminary study of individual behavior 
and a subjective nature, however of a substantial (or essential, ‘wesentlich’) 
24)ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, 1132b31, op. cit., p. 281, in Menger’s copy: Nik. Ethik., p. 
145. Also Ethica Nicomachea, Oxford, 1925 (translation by Ross): “Now this unit is in truth demand, 
which holds all things together” (1133a26-27) There appears that notion of what is common (koinÒj).
Elements of the reception of Aristotelian thought 
Philosophia 2013/2 I 29
nature: ethics was for Aristotle the necessary introduction to politics, as he 
stated in Book I of Nicomachean Ethics.25 Aristotle’s politics after his ethics 
thus define the domain of ethics (and economic matters embedded in it) as a 
“propedeutics” to higher theoretical matters (to be “contemplated” or theorized, 
because qeèrhma means precisely contemplation). Comes first in heuristic 
order individual behavior, as the basis for knowledge:
We ought to make an attempt to determine at all events in outline what exactly 
this Supreme Good is, and of which of the theoretical or practical sciences it is the 
object. Now it would be agreed that it must be the object of the most authoritative 
of the sciences – some science which is pre-eminently a master craft. But such is 
manifestly the science of Politics […]; and we observe that even the most highly 
esteemed of the faculties, such as strategy, domestic economy, oratory, are subor-
dinate to the political science.26 
The Politics is consequently the next step in a general analysis of human 
action: Aristotle’s ultimate goal., the aim of his inquiry is the “Supreme Good”, 
which implies that, rather than considering at first possibly delusive collective 
entities without resorting to behavior that explains how exchange works, it is 
reverse! Menger follows Aristotle there, ordering study from human individual 
reasoning, to dual partnership and later competition at large in populated 
groups. The famous definition by Aristotle must be placed into this context:
From these things [a previous passage by Menger heavily stressed in Aristotle’s 
work], therefore it is clear that the city-state is a natural growth, and that man is 
by nature a political animal, and a man that is by nature and not merely by fortune 
citiless is either low in the scale of humanity or above it […] And why man is a poli-
tical animal in a greater measure than any bee or any gregarious animal is clear.27 
In Menger’s times, that passage was interpreted as indicating that human 
beings were ontological parts of the community (the Greek city, extended by 
commentators to the German nation) and oriented towards the realization of 
the utmost good, and mostly before all any other consideration28. This is the 
25)Also in the Magna Ethica and the Eudemian Ethics, but the volumes are not in the Menger 
Library. 
26)ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, 1094a25-30, pp. 5-7; Nik. Eth., p. 16. Menger underlined 
the passage.
27)ARISTOTLE, Politics, 1253a7-10, tr. H. Rackham, op. cit., p. 9-11.
28)Ibid., also in the incipit of the Politics: 1252a1: “Every state is as I see a sort of partnership, and 
every partnership is formed with a view to some good (since all the actions of all mankind are done 
with a view to what they think to be good). It is therefore evident that, while all partnerships aim at 
some good, the partnership that is the most supreme of all and includes all the others does so most 
of all, and aims at the most supreme of all goods; and this is the partnership entitled the state, the 
political association.”, tr. H. Rackham, op. cit., p. 3.
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interpretation that prevailed and that Menger rebuked. Menger’s opponents 
raised it as an obstacle to his attempt to renew the science of economics. 
Therefore, the point was decisive among scholars, where, still at the end of the 
nineteenth century, resorting to Ancient philosophy gave authority (as explained 
in the previous section of thisn paper). No wonder that Menger dedicated the 
matter a whole appendix (VII) of his 1883 Investigations into the Method: “On 
the Opinion Attributed to Aristotle, that the State be originally given with the 
Existence of Mankind”, a text that we shall now discuss.
3.3. Appendix VII of Menger’s Investigations in the Method 
(1883)
Indeed, Menger’s originating the method later labeled “methodological 
individualism” is a matter related to his renewed interpretation of Aristotle’s 
notions: how that origin is has to be acknowledged consistently shows within 
the contents of Appendix VII of the Untersuchungen29. And Menger’s fight 
with the German Historicists was the stronger as he tackled that topic from 
the attacks he received starting from interpretations of Aristotle. Things were 
confused because the Historicists mixed Menger’s views with the Classical 
doctrine of homo economicus, but Menger retorted without resorting to that 
creed, rather leaving aside Classical political economy and finding in Aristotle 
elements for his own line of reasoning, starting from individualistic behavior to 
gradually reach, step by step, the phenomenon of spontaneous emergence 
of larger institutions, whose development he explained by decisions from 
individual components, not by any assumed “collective entity”. His approach 
was later called “methodological individualism”30. 
29)MENGER, C., Untersuchungen über die Methode der Sozialwissenschaften und der Politischen 
Oekonomie insbesondere, Anhang VII: “Ueber die dem Aristoteles zugeschriebene Meinung, dass 
die Erscheinung des Staates eine ursprüngliche zugleich mit der Existenz des Menschen gegebene 
sei”. The volume was published in Leipzig, by Duncker & Humblot. I shall use the reprint (similar 
page numbers) by Mohr, Tübingen, 1970. Let me add that I have provided the first French transla-
tion in 2011, after 128 years! CAMPAGNOLO, Gilles, Recherches sur la méthode dans les sciences 
sociales et en économie politique en particulier, presentation and full translation with commentary, 
2011, Paris, EHESS UP, EHESS-Translations series first volume, 576 p.  
30)The term is not Menger’s – rather that of later members of the Austrian school: Friedrich von 
Wieser, Josef Schumpeter Menger only spoke of “atomism” (Atomismus). Yet he did not reenact 
the doctrines of the classical economists of the nineteenth century. Let us explain for the sake of 
clarity that Menger labeled “individual” (“individuell”) what was located to space and time, events 
that happened in some given context. The term itself thus qualifies historical facts and corresponds 
to what we would regard as “singular” events, happening only once, here and there – precisely the 
material that was used successively by Roscher for his inductive “parallelism-building” method and 
by Schmoller for his comparative analysis through variants and differences between phenomena. 
Conversely, in Menger, knowledge of these facts belongs to the historical facet of economics, 
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Menger’s opponents put forward Aristotle’s definition of human being as 
a “political animal”, from the first lines of the Politics so as to support the idea 
that the collective would come first and rule from all ontological, heuristic and 
even chronological points of view. The City (pÒlij) came first, individual being 
part of it and second to it, as a “part of the whole”, bearing no sense if (or once) 
cut from the whole body collective. That line was inspired by the vulgarized 
representation of German Idealism mentioned earlier and philosophers from 
the beginning of the nineteenth century, Hegel to begin with, were interpreted 
systematically so from the “beautiful totality” (“schöne Totalität”) notion, 
separated from the philosophy of history it entailed. Menger’s opponents had 
wrongly understood the “schöne Totalität”, that “Hegelian” excellent phrase as 
an anthropological statement (which it is not). Speculative philosophy had been 
mistaken for a positive discourse upon the real causes of mankind’s evolution. 
If causal realism was indeed at stake, Menger’s position could be supported 
by Aristotelian evidence. Moreover, it could be supported by logical reasoning 
full-stop – which would prove best all along later on, if not in the context of the 
German Academy of his times.
The German Historicists were de facto empirically convinced that the 
Greek city did not exist through its citizens, but quasi per se. Although that 
is arguable, Hegel would certainly not have said so. And Menger saw there 
only nonsense. He said it in Appendix VII: “impossible to sustain, simply 
nonsensical”.31 Consistently, Menger rebuked the term “Volks-wirtschaftslehre” 
as such – as a study of the Volk: archives show how he intended to modify 
the title of his 1871 Principles of Political Economy (Grundsätze der 
Volkswirtschaftslehre) into a more conform Pure theoretical Economics (Reine 
theoretische Wirtschaftslehre).32 
Menger had to prove his own views against his opponents: he did so by 
using Aristotle. First, he reproached vulgar interpreters with cutting off that 
sentence from its context in The Politics. Facing hostility from his colleagues, 
Menger would not reproach them with using an argument of authority that 
proved only stubbornness in their following of ancient texts, but he re-read 
those same texts for the sake of clarity in the light of a reshuffled interpretation, 
which he claimed closer to the meaning the Ancient himself conveyed. 
therefore not to its theory. As far as theory is concerned, such “individuell Erscheinungen” shall 
not be considered, but only the general analysis of elementary fact. Menger’s analysis is close to 
Cartesian, or Hobbesian rules of understanding.
31)MENGER, C., Anhang VII, op. cit.: “unhaltbare, ja geradezu sinnlose”, p. 267 sq. Our translation.
32)That is clear from his crossing out the title on the copy of his own book that had been sent to 
him by his Viennese publisher W. Braumüller, as can be observed on location in his Library in Japan.
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Menger’s foes would have nothing else to resort to and Menger was more 
challenging (and convincing) that way. Appendix VII of the Untersuchungen is 
such a demonstration: Menger translated the text, then voluntarily paraphrased 
what Aristotle did not deny, that is the possibility of uncivilized mankind existing 
not only before the Greek cities, and even before “barbarian” kingdoms. Within 
this uncivilized condition a tendency to socialize gradually grew, until it reached 
the point of state-building. The idea of Aristotle that Menger likes to quote, is 
that “man [human being, ¥nqrwpoj] is a “political animal [zwÒn politikÒn]” but that 
he can be so only after a stage preliminary to civilization. Thus, Aristotle did not 
demonstrate that men always necessarily lived within the frame of a city, or a 
state – rather the contrary. Subsequently, the state is not chronologically prior 
(or at least as old as mankind) – rather the contrary.33
Menger also objected that any “holist” creed could be made in good faith 
in the light of texts by Aristotle. Although Menger did not indict it directly, for the 
readers of his times, the background interpretation of Romantic philhellenism, 
in a “renaissance” of German national identity that identified to dreamed cities 
of Ancient Greece, was clear. When, in the second half of the century, it shifted 
to Pangermanism, it took over national feelings to embody them in the notion 
of Volk, it was made to serve purposes other than mere speculation.34 Such 
argument discarded the role of the individual. Aristotle was recruited to debase 
it but an exact quote from The Politics showed the order chosen by Aristotle 
was chronologically, and also ontologically calling for such a role in Ancient 
Greek thought, with individuals coming first, then families, and groups (or 
tribes) last emerging in cities and states, rather than the contrary. 
Indeed, the Greek representation of the world displayed men freeing 
themselves from the Cyclopes, who had also small families and comunities! 
Of course, men cannot know of such mythological times, but Homer’s poems 
serve as a basis to which Aristotle referred: “And this is what Homer means: 
And each one giveth law / To sons and eke to spouses – for his Cyclopes live 
in scattered families; and that is the way in which people used to live in early 
times”.35 
Menger’s foes would support the idea that this was mythological. But 
33)MENGER, C., op. cit., pp. 269-70. I restitute the paraphrase, though I summarize it. Greek terms 
in Menger.
34)CAMPAGNOLO, G., op. cit. 2010, Part I, chapter 2: “Sources of German Political Economy as a 
Building-Block of National Identity”.
35)MENGER, C., op. cit., ibid, p. 269, from Aristotle, Politics, I, 1252b23, tr. H. Rackham, op. cit., 
p. 9.
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was not their interest in historical matters bound to show the same? To think 
of a human being without thinking of that human being gradually bringing up 
communities would be impossible. What Aristotle meant with “zwÒn politikÒn” 
was then a concept of mankind without there being first of all a notion of state: 
no mankind without the vision of the emergence of socio-political orders and 
environment. As a matter of fact, sentences in Aristotle support the view both 
arguments by Menger and historicist views when understood properly: once 
the state exists, then it becomes necessary to justify it but before that, the state 
has already to come to existence. And every human being played a role in 
that achievement for the whole. Therefore, the metaphorical image of limbs 
and organs in the physical body applies as well to the political body, but has 
to be understood as evolutionary, indeed to engender a lasting tradition of 
“organicism”. That in turn contributes to prove 1) that elements to discuss how 
this body is organized and how it functions are individual parts, and 2) that 
there is a progress where individual comes first:
Uncivilized man might not be thought of without resorting to the state and, mo-
reover, that the emergence of the state may of all necessity be as ancient as that 
of human beings either: a view that Aristotle never ever supported”. What is indeed 
the case is that “the human being in the Greek sense of the term, the civilized hu-
man being cannot be older than the state. 36 
Human beings existed before any “Kultur-Menschen” lived in a regulated 
or civilized community (as primitive as one may imagine). Even before such a 
world existed, as early as some reason was imparted to human beings, they 
would therefore act according to rules that make exchange an understandable 
process. In other words, language and other institutions that render trade 
intelligible make the world go round and scientists get wiser when that truth 
applies to any situation, even before state came into existence. It means 
that relationships between human beings exist when these are regarded as 
partners-in-trade (“economic agents” to use modern parlance) in order to 
understand the very emergence of communities as such. 
Civilization itself will develop from there: institutions emerge and grow, and 
spontaneous self-organization of mankind make sense, explaining how states, 
money and all institutions appeared.37 Menger developed that facet in Book 
36)Ibid, p. 269-70. Our translation from Menger’s phrasing. The “uncivilized human being” or rather 
“pre-civilized” (Ur-kultur-mensch) is in contrast with the “civilized” one (“Cultur-mensch”) that His-
toricists said they could think of without connecting it to the state: “Der Cultur-Mensch ist ohne 
Staat nicht denkbar”, ibid. What Menger reckoned is only that the latter is true of the already Greek 
human being: “der Culturmensch nicht älter als der Staat sein könne”.
37)Given the fact that Friedrich Hayek was much inspired by these reflections by Menger, but also 
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III of his 1883 Untersuchungen: the origins of such thinking are found in (or, 
at least, are in conformity with) his analysis of Aristotle. The argument once 
opposed to Menger’s reasoning now turned in his favor, linking ontological 
and chronological as facets of the same coin: the economist may well decide 
for himself about what comes first ontologically, but does not need to, as the 
Historicists insisted on. Menger (and we, modern readers) may rather suspend 
judgment and Menger showed that Historicism could not, in the face of the texts 
by Aristotle, decide for their own cause, neither in terms of logical reasoning, 
nor upon the basis of the Ancient philosopher’s texts. 
Methodologically speaking, individualism appeared as the relevant stand, 
and probably the only one based on a conform and consistent interpretation 
of Aristotle. Thus, historical elements were now invoked in favor of the 
individualistic theoretical frame so formulated.38
Relationships that individuals build regarding their material interest explain 
and ensure that the community be “cemented”, provided fair justice be upheld, 
said Aristotle. Here again, unlike later on Hayek, Menger did not oppose the 
view, rather questioned meanings: it is precisely because Aristotle’s opinion 
starts with individual behavior that Book V on justice makes sense, because 
partnership (Books VIII and IX) seems to Menger to answer Book V and give 
the solution of preliminary stage exchange process within the field of ethics, 
before reaching any political level. What the city would end up showing was 
the utmost good formed through the thousands vicissitudes of intersubjective 
relationships that all tend towards achieving the satisfaction of needs. Aristotle 
insisted that, without such a personal goal, the meaning of elementary activities 
could not be understood the same. It did not mean either (but Menger would 
never say) that such activities be the last stage of human accomplishment. 
that he added his own ideas, the common view today was much influenced by later thinking than 
Menger’s. Through legitimizing the method that starts with the individual, Menger stated a non-
necessary feature of the relationship linking together the state to human beings. That sufficed for 
his demonstration. Hayek’s more global position hostile to “social constructs” was not Menger’s, 
as the Untersuchungen clearly show. Menger insisted that all institutions were not purposely and 
“conscientiously” born, and on spontaneity in this emergence but did not mean to regard all social 
intents as unworthy, useless, or deemed to unintended consequences self-destructive or counter-
productive. Menger indeed inspired some such views in some later heirs– who maybe forgot Ar-
istotle. 
38)As early as is 1871 Grundsätze, Menger displayed historical elements in his reflections, that he 
collected from the same material as Historicists: narratives by explorers, etc. that one may find in 
his Library (roughly one third of the 20,000 volumes kept therein), but made to fit a frame directly 
opposed to “empirical” naïve historicism.
Elements of the reception of Aristotelian thought 
Philosophia 2013/2 I 35
4. Conclusion
To this day, Aristotelianism on the one hand, Hegelianism on the other hand 
remain two vivid sources to build concepts beyond philosophy – even if in the 
twentieth century they seem to have been chased away. As far as economics 
is concerned, methodological individualism required a truly individualistic view, 
which the founder of the Austrian school brought from his reading of Aristotle, 
putting aside the collective concepts and entities of the Historicists and reaching 
to the conclusion that the Aristotelian frame is individualistic, with the evidence 
of texts. The state finds its source in individuals who already gathered together, 
the 1883 Investigations is very clear in that regard. Menger showed no mercy 
for the Historicists’ mistakes and the Dispute on the methods (Methodenstreit), 
though displaying considerable acrimony on both sides, ended with Menger 
showing he sided with Aristotle, where precisely he had been challenged. His 
tactics was superior, his reading more cautious. 
In other (and last) words, considering Aristotelian notions in Menger’s 
reading, we may conclude that Menger did not need the support of those, 
like Oskar Kraus who, claiming to defend his views, uselessly (and, at times, 
frivolously) criticized so-called “Hegelianism” to show conversely how close 
Menger and Aristotle were. Kraus’ conclusion was right: 
Aristotle indeed approached that [a theory of value grounded on marginal utility, 
born from subjectively felt needs] so close that, from his theory to that of the mo-
dern ‘psychological school’39, the bridge could be crossed with a light step 40.
But Kraus was unwise to support his argument by indicting Hegel. The 
“reconstruction” he claimed to see in Aristotle was somehow far fetched41, while 
the best way to achieve his goal to support individuality versus collective entities 
and to give methodological individualism a solid justification was simply to examine 
Menger’s text – well, true, not only the published material, but also some of the 
unpublished: archives that provide today’s commentators with clear evidence42.
39)Psychologenschule: this is another misnaming fir the Austrian school as I showed in CAMPAG-
NOLO, G. (2008), “Was the Austrian School a “Psychological” School in the realm of Economics 
in Carl Menger’s view?”, in CAMPAGNOLO, G. (ed.), Carl Menger. Neu erörtert unter Einbeziehung 
nachgelassener Texte / Discussed on the Basis of New Findings, Frankfurt/Main – Wien, Peter Lang 
Verlag, pp. 165-186.
40)KRAUS, Oscar, “Die aristotelische Werttheorie...”, 1905, op. cit., p 590. Our translation from 
the German.
41)Kraus had sent his copy (a “Sonderdruck”) of his article to Menger who annotated it – not always 
kindly For more detail, see CAMPAGNOLO, G., 2002, op. cit. Kraus showed interest in Menger’s 
disciples Böhm-Bawerk and Wieser, where caution is in order as well.
42)And this is plainly reckoned when a text like my «Un exemple de réception de l’économie oc-
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cidentale au Japon: le Fonds Carl Menger de l’Université de Hitotsubashi», in Lucas N. and C. 
Sakai (eds.), Japon Pluriel 4, Paris, Picquier (2001), pp. 211-221, is in turn translated by the local 
Japanese center where the archives is located: ‘Mengâ-bunko: aru keizaishisô no genshiryô’, Bul-
letin of the Center for Historical Social Science, 22 (2002), Tokyo, pp. 23-39.
